








Multinationals do not export jobs,  
and other related results 
 
Kwok Tong Soo 
 
The Department of Economics 
Lancaster University Management School 











All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed 
two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission, 
provided that full acknowledgement is given. 
 
 





Multinationals do not export jobs, and other 
related results* 
 






We develop a simple model of multinational firms, in which firms engage in 
production abroad to take advantage of cheap labour. There are gains from 
multinational firms beyond the standard gains from trade. The model makes 
two empirically testable predictions. First, firms with more foreign 
employment also have more domestic employment; multinationals are not 
net exporters of jobs. Second, the expansion of multinational activity will 
increase the overall size of the firm. We find that both predictions hold 
empirically, using a sample of the largest multinational firms. In addition, 
the presence of multinational firms raises welfare relative to when they are 
absent, although the proportional gain is not large.  
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Multinational firms play an important role in the modern economy. Although perhaps 
not as big and powerful as they are sometimes made out to be (see De Grauwe and 
Camerman (2002)), they have undeniably captured the attention of the popular press. 
In addition, some of the numbers associated with multinational firms are truly large. 
For example, in 2015 the 100 largest multinational firms (as measured by their foreign 
assets) had total assets worth $12 trillion, total sales of $7 trillion, and employed a 
total of 14 million workers. Because of their size and importance, an important and 
policy-relevant question is whether multinational firms “export jobs”. That is, whether 
by shifting some of their production process abroad, they reduce employment at home. 
A closely related question is whether a multinational firm that expands its foreign 
operations becomes larger as a result. This may affect the degree of competitiveness 
and the varieties available for consumption in the market, and hence the welfare of 
consumers.  
 
This paper seeks to address both questions, from both a theoretical and empirical 
perspective. First, we develop a simple model of the multinational firm, in which firms 
may engage in production abroad to take advantage of cheap labour. This has been 
referred to in the literature as vertical foreign direct investment (FDI). The model 
allows for the separation of fixed and variable production costs across countries, in the 
framework of the Krugman (1980) model of trade under monopolistic competition. We 
assume one factor of production, and the co-existence of multinational and national 
firms in a model without firm heterogeneity. The simple model enables us to compare 
the welfare implications of multinational firms versus trade in final products alone. 
Allowing for multinational firms results in a modest welfare gain for both trading 
partners. Although multinational firms are larger than the domestic firms they have 
replaced, implying a smaller number of varieties available for consumption (and leading 
to fears over the homogenization of the high street (New Economics Foundation 
(2007))), this is more than outweighed by the gain from increased productivity of 
multinational firms.  
 
The model makes two key predictions. First, firms which expand their foreign activities 
also expand their domestic activities. That is, domestic and foreign employment are 
complements, and multinational firms are not net exporters of jobs. This prediction is 
driven by a key assumption we make, that multinational firms incur an additional 
fixed headquarters cost when expanding their foreign activities. This additional cost 
may be thought of as the cost of coordinating activities at a distance. The second main 
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prediction of the model is that firms which expand their international activities become 
larger as a result. This suggests that expanding into foreign production may be a 
strategy for firms to gain an advantage over their competitors. We take both 
predictions to data on the largest multinational firms in the world, and confirm both 
predictions of the model, especially when we control for unobserved heterogeneity 
across firms and the endogeneity of firms’ employment decisions.  
 
There has of course been much academic literature on multinational firms. Recent 
surveys include Antras and Yeaple (2014) Bernard et al (2017). The modern literature 
originated from the literature on international trade under imperfect competition, and 
can be divided into several different strands. First, there is what Brainard (1993, 1997) 
refers to as the proximity-concentration hypothesis. Here, firms engage in 
multinational behaviour in order to avoid transport costs and tariff barriers, and to 
benefit from scale economies at the plant level; an early exemplar of this literature is 
Krugman (1983). This strand of the literature relates to horizontal FDI. Second, there 
is the factor proportions hypothesis, where multinational firms are incorporated into a 
model of trade with factor endowments differences and imperfect competition (see 
Markusen (1984), Helpman (1984, 1985), Helpman and Krugman (1985)). Here, 
multinational firms emerge in response to differences in factor prices across countries, 
and takes the form of vertical FDI. Third, there is the literature on the advantages 
that multinational firms possess, which means that firms prefer to internalise their 
production rather than outsource it to other firms in arms-length transactions (Ethier 
(1986), Antras (2003), Antras and Helpman (2004))1. This paper is most closely related 
to the second strand of the literature, on vertical FDI. We depart from the standard 
formulation by adopting a simpler, one-factor setup, which allows us to explicitly derive 
the gains from multinational firms, and the implications for firm size and firm 
activities. In addition, we assume a fixed number of multinational firms, so that they 
make potentially positive profits in equilibrium. This requires a different solution 
method to the standard approach, which we describe in detail.  
 
In the model, firms may find it profitable to produce abroad, because of technological 
differences across countries. Therefore, the paper is related to the literature on 
technological differences across countries in models of trade under imperfect 
competition, for instance Ricci (1997), Chung (2007) and Soo (2016). Also similar in 
approach to that taken in the present paper is Lo (2005, 2014), who also develops 
models of multinational firms based on technological differences across countries. 
Compared to this work, the present paper allows for the simultaneous existence of both 
                                                          
1 See Appendix A for a discussion of the distinction between “multinational firms” and “offshoring”.  
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multinational and national firms, which turns out to have large implications for the 
predictions of the model. For instance, the co-existence of domestic and multinational 
firms means that wages are unaffected by the presence of multinational firms2. The 
model in this paper also yields testable predictions which we take to the data.  
 
On the empirical side, there has also been much work on the relationship between a 
multinational firm’s domestic and foreign activities. Slaughter (2013) argues that US 
firms’ expansion abroad is complementary to their US operations, and also creates jobs 
in other US firms. On the other hand, Simpson (2012a, 2012b) finds that UK 
multinational firms tend to substitute foreign workers for domestic workers, especially 
in low-skill-intensive sectors. These are similar to the findings of Bernard and Jensen 
(2007) for US multinationals. In other related work, Amiti and Wei (2009) show that 
offshoring has positive effects on productivity in the US. Gorg et al (2008) find similar 
results for Irish firms. Keller and Yeaple (2009) find positive spillover effects of FDI 
on the productivity of other firms in the sector in the US, while Girma et al (2015) 
find similar results for Chinese firms.  
 
The next section outlines the theoretical model, starting with the case of trade in goods 
alone, and then allowing for multinational firms. Section 3 discusses the empirical 
evidence. The final section provides some concluding comments.  
 
2 The model 
 
The starting point of the model is the Krugman (1980) model of international trade 
under monopolistic competition. Let there be two countries, 𝑗𝑗 = 𝐻𝐻,𝐹𝐹 for Home and 
Foreign, one factor of production, labour, and one sector, which is comprised of a 
continuum of differentiated varieties 𝑖𝑖. The utility function of the representative 
consumer is:  
𝑈𝑈 = ∫ 𝑐𝑐(𝑖𝑖)𝜃𝜃𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛0 ,                          0 < 𝜃𝜃 < 1. (1)  
Where the two countries differ from each other, is in the production functions of each 
variety. Suppose that production of a variety requires two activities: headquarters 
activities, represented by a fixed cost in production, and assembly activities, 
represented by a variable cost. Assume without loss of generality that Home is a 
developed country and Foreign a less developed country, so that (1) Home has a 
comparative advantage in producing headquarters services and Foreign in producing 
                                                          
2 Since multinational firms make profits in equilibrium, if the workers of these firms also own the firms, 
their total income will be higher than that of workers in national firms.  
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assembly services, and (2) Home has an absolute advantage in both activities. Then 
the production functions in the two countries will take the following form:  
𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 . (2) 
As discussed above, throughout the paper we will use the following assumptions on 
parameter values:  
 
Assumption 1: 𝛼𝛼𝐻𝐻 < 𝛼𝛼𝐹𝐹 , 𝛽𝛽𝐻𝐻 < 𝛽𝛽𝐹𝐹,   𝛼𝛼𝐻𝐻/𝛽𝛽𝐻𝐻 < 𝛼𝛼𝐹𝐹/𝛽𝛽𝐹𝐹 . 
 
Consider first the case of autarky. The solution of the model follows the procedure 
which has been well-established since Krugman (1980). We obtain the profit-
maximising price and output of the representative firm given free entry and exit, and 
the equilibrium number of varieties produced in each country: 
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝜃𝜃𝜆𝜆 �𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖�𝜃𝜃−1 = 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗𝑤𝑤𝑗𝑗𝜃𝜃 ,                    𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗𝜃𝜃𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗(1−𝜃𝜃) ,                     𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖 = 𝐿𝐿𝑗𝑗(1−𝜃𝜃)𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗 . (3)  
Given symmetry across varieties, per capita consumption of each variety in each 
country is:  
𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝐿𝐿𝑗𝑗 =  𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗𝜃𝜃𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗(1−𝜃𝜃)𝐿𝐿𝑗𝑗 . (4)  
Hence utility under autarky is:  
𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖
𝐴𝐴 = 𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜃𝜃 = �𝜃𝜃𝐿𝐿𝑗𝑗�𝜃𝜃 (1 − 𝜃𝜃)1−𝜃𝜃 �𝐿𝐿𝑗𝑗𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗 �𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗�𝜃𝜃� . (5)  
Autarkic utility depends on the size of the labour force, technology, and the 
substitutability between varieties in consumption. Note that given Assumption 1, if 
the two countries have the same labour force, Home consumers would enjoy a higher 
level of utility in autarky than Foreign consumers, because of Home’s absolute 
advantage in both fixed and variable costs.  
 
2.1 Equilibrium with trade in final goods 
 
Suppose trade in final goods is costless. The results for prices, output and number of 
varieties from the previous sub-section remain unchanged. It can be shown that 





























. (6𝑏𝑏)  
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Since 𝜃𝜃 < 1, Home-produced varieties are more expensive than Foreign-produced 
varieties, implying that Home firms are smaller than Foreign firms3, but Home real 
(and nominal) wages are higher than Foreign real (and nominal) wages. Given 
symmetry across varieties produced in each country and no trade costs, free trade 
utility can be written as:  
𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖
𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 = ∫ 𝑐𝑐(𝑖𝑖)𝜃𝜃𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖+𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖0 = 𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻𝜃𝜃 + 𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝜃𝜃        = �𝜃𝜃𝛀𝛀𝒋𝒋𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭�𝜃𝜃(1 − 𝜃𝜃)1−𝜃𝜃 ∑ �𝐿𝐿𝑗𝑗𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗 �𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗�𝜃𝜃�𝑖𝑖=𝐻𝐻,𝐹𝐹 , (7)  
Where 𝛀𝛀𝒋𝒋
𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭 = 1 �𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 + �𝑤𝑤𝑘𝑘 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖⁄ �𝐿𝐿𝑘𝑘�⁄  is the consumption share of an individual in country 
𝑗𝑗, 𝑘𝑘 indicates the trading partner, and the similarity to the autarkic utility (5) can be 




𝐴𝐴 = �1 + �𝐿𝐿𝑘𝑘𝐿𝐿𝑗𝑗� �𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗𝛼𝛼𝑘𝑘�1−𝜃𝜃 �𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘�𝜃𝜃�1−𝜃𝜃 > 1. (8)  
The gains from trade are a function of the two trading partners’ relative sizes, and the 
relative technologies. As is often the case in these types of models, a smaller country 
gains proportionally more than a larger country; however, because of Assumption 1, if 
the two countries have the same labour endowments, the Foreign country will 
experience larger gains from trade. This is shown in Figure 1. Intuitively, this is because 
Home has the technological advantage, so the effective labour endowment of Home is 
greater than that of Foreign.   
 
2.2 Multinational firms 
 
Suppose that firms are able to separate the two activities involved in production across 
countries. Headquarters activities always have to be produced in the country of origin, 
while assembly activities can be produced abroad. Since Home has a comparative 
advantage in headquarters activities, and Foreign in assembly, Foreign firms have no 
incentive to separate their activities, whereas Home firms do. If assembly activities are 
produced abroad, then, following the discussion in Baldwin (2016), a multinational 
firm will employ Foreign workers at low Foreign wages, but use superior Home 
technology4. Even though firms are identical to each other in autarky or free trade, 
                                                          
3 This is not entirely satisfactory, since we would expect developed country firms to be larger on average 
than developing country firms. One possible way to get around this problem would be to allow firms to 
choose the production technology (e.g. a high fixed cost combined with a low marginal cost, versus a 
low fixed cost but a high marginal cost), and impose some restriction that results in developed country 
firms choosing the former, and developing country firms choosing the latter. This formulation is beyond 
the scope of the paper.  
4 This assumption is not necessary for the results below; we get the same qualitative results if we assume 
that the multinational firm employs Foreign workers using Foreign technology.  
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they may differ in their ability to coordinate activities across borders. Hence, suppose 
that each pre-existing Home firm has a probability 0 < 𝜓𝜓 < 1 of becoming a 
multinational firm. This implies that the number of multinational firms, 𝑛𝑛𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 = 𝜓𝜓𝑛𝑛𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴, 
where 𝑛𝑛𝐻𝐻
𝐴𝐴 is the number of Home firms in autarky. This fixed number of multinational 
firms will have important implications for the solution of the model, since we can no 
longer invoke free entry and exit and the zero profit condition to pin down the size of 
each multinational firm.  
 
Figure 1: Gains from trade in final goods alone.  
 
Note: Parameter values assumed: 𝛼𝛼𝐻𝐻 = 2,   𝛼𝛼𝐹𝐹 = 8,   𝛽𝛽𝐻𝐻 = 1.5,   𝛽𝛽𝐹𝐹 = 3,   𝜃𝜃 = 0.8,   𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 + 𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹 = 24.  
 
Further, suppose that for the Home firms which become multinational firms, each firm 
allocates a fraction 0 < 𝛾𝛾 < 1 of their assembly activities abroad, there are no fixed 
costs of foreign production (an assumption used in Krugman (1983)), and that the 
separation also incurs an additional fixed cost at Home, equal to 𝛾𝛾𝛼𝛼𝐻𝐻. This may be the 
cost of coordinating activities at a distance, and as discussed below, will be a crucial 
assumption in what follows5. Appendix B discusses the implications of allowing for an 
additional fixed cost in Foreign (for instance, to represent a fixed cost of setting up 
the factory abroad); this turns out not to affect the main results of the model. Then 
the profit function of the firm is:  
𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 = 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 − (1 + 𝛾𝛾)𝑤𝑤𝐻𝐻𝛼𝛼𝐻𝐻 − (1 − 𝛾𝛾)𝑤𝑤𝐻𝐻𝛽𝛽𝐻𝐻𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 − 𝛾𝛾𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹𝛽𝛽𝐻𝐻𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 . (9)  
                                                          
5 This implies that fixed costs are a larger fraction of a multinational firm’s total cost compared with a 
national firm. For simplicity we treat 𝛾𝛾 as exogenous, as if Samuelson’s Angel (Samuelson (1949)) had 
descended from heaven to divide the multinational firm’s activities in this way. Endogenising 𝛾𝛾 is left 















For it to be worthwhile for a firm to switch from being a national firm to being a 
multinational firm, equation (9) must be non-negative for 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 = 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻, which 
corresponds to 𝑤𝑤𝐻𝐻 𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹⁄ ≥ 𝜃𝜃 (2𝜃𝜃 − 1)⁄ . This inequality holds for sufficiently large values 
of 𝜃𝜃, which is what we will assume. There are several unusual features of the 
multinational equilibrium. First, since the assembly process uses both Home and 
Foreign workers, the equilibrium price of 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 is:  
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 = 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖[(1−𝛾𝛾)𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖+𝛾𝛾𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖]𝜃𝜃 . (10)  
From whence it can be established that 𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 𝑑𝑑𝛾𝛾⁄ < 0; the larger the fraction of 
assembly activities produced abroad, the lower the (relative) price of the 
multinational’s output. In general, multinational prices are always lower than those of 
domestic Home firms, and may also be lower than those of domestic Foreign firms if 𝛾𝛾 
is sufficiently large. Because some Home firms and all Foreign firms remain as national 
firms, the relative wages and prices are unchanged, and remain as they are in equations 
(6a) and (6b)6.  
 
Since we assume a fixed number of multinational firms, there is no additional entry or 
exit of multinational firms. Multinational firms, having chosen their profit-maximising 
price following (10), will produce the quantity that is determined by their demand 
curve given the fixed number of multinational firms. Hence, to solve for the size of 








𝜃𝜃−1 . (11)  
From this, we obtain:  
𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 = 𝚽𝚽� 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝜃𝜃𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖(1−𝜃𝜃)� = 𝚽𝚽𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻 > 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻 , (12)  




𝜃𝜃−1 > 1 since 0 < 𝜃𝜃 < 1 and 𝑤𝑤𝐻𝐻 > 𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹, and 𝑑𝑑𝚽𝚽 𝑑𝑑𝛾𝛾⁄ > 0. 𝚽𝚽 may 
be thought of as a scaling factor for how big a multinational firm is, relative to a 
domestic Home firm. For sufficiently large values of 𝛾𝛾, multinational firms are also 
larger than domestic Foreign firms. Substituting into the profit function (9) shows that 
for profits to be non-negative (and hence for the number of multinational firms 𝑛𝑛𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 
to be an equilibrium), it must be that:  
𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 ≥
(1+𝛾𝛾)𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖[(1−𝛾𝛾)𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖+𝛾𝛾𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖] � 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝜃𝜃𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖(1−𝜃𝜃)� , (13)  
or:  
                                                          
6 Technically, this plays a role similar to the assumption of a homogeneous goods sector in other models: 
it pins down the relative wage.  
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(1 − 𝛾𝛾)𝑤𝑤𝐻𝐻 + 𝛾𝛾𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹 ≤ (1 + 𝛾𝛾)𝜃𝜃−1𝜃𝜃 𝑤𝑤𝐻𝐻. (14)  
We assume that this inequality is satisfied. Multinational firms may earn supernormal 
profits, and these profits are uniformly distributed to consumers in Home. This is in 
line with Coeurdacier and Rey (2012), who show that although the home bias in 
equities is decreasing, it remains an important feature of the structure of firm 
ownership. By making this assumption, we avoid issues relating to the distribution of 
income, which may have additional welfare implications beyond those discussed below. 
Nevertheless, the presence of profits which are distributed only to Home consumers 
means that the overall distribution of income is skewed towards Home (and away from 
Foreign), and this will have implications for the distribution of gains from 
multinational firms across the two countries.  
 
The following results can be shown, assuming 𝛼𝛼𝐻𝐻 > 𝛽𝛽𝐻𝐻 (i.e. the fixed cost is sufficiently 
large relative to the variable cost):  
𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑑𝑑𝛾𝛾
> 0,               𝑑𝑑𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑑𝑑𝛾𝛾
> 0,                𝑑𝑑𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑑𝑑𝛾𝛾
> 0. (15)  
That is, as the fraction of assembly activities produced in Foreign rises, the firm’s 
output rises, as does its employment of both Home and Foreign workers, 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀
𝐻𝐻  and 
𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀
𝐹𝐹 . That is, the model predicts that multinational firms do not “export jobs”: more 
employment abroad is consistent with more employment at home. Hence we can state:  
 
Result 1: There is a positive association between domestic and foreign employment of 
a multinational firm.  
 
In our empirical analysis, we only have data on firms’ revenues, not output. We can 
calculate total revenue of a firm as follows:  
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻 = 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖1−𝜃𝜃 ,                𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹 = 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖1−𝜃𝜃 ,                 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖1−𝜃𝜃 𝚽𝚽𝜃𝜃. (16)  
A multinational firm’s revenue is increasing in its share of foreign assembly activities 
𝛾𝛾. Once again, multinational firms headquartered in Home earn more revenue than 
domestic Home firms, and for sufficiently large values of 𝛾𝛾, also earn more revenue 
than domestic Foreign firms. Hence:  
 
Result 2: The more activities a firm performs abroad, the larger will be the firm.  
 
Note the direction of causality here. Firms are ex ante identical to each other; it is the 
act of becoming a multinational firm that makes firms larger. In the next section, we 
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take Results 1 and 2 to the data. Before that, it is worth noting the key assumption 
required to obtain Result 1. This is the additional fixed cost associated with becoming 
a multinational firm. Absent this additional cost, it is immediately obvious that Result 
1 will not hold, since the rest of the model implies substitution between domestic and 
foreign employment of assembly workers. On the other hand, inspection of equation 
(16) makes it clear that the multinational firm’s total revenue does not depend on the 
presence of this additional fixed cost.  
 
2.3 The welfare implications of multinational firms and trade patterns 
 
To obtain the welfare implications of allowing for multinational firms, we first have to 
solve for the number of each type of firm. Assume that we have an internal solution 
(i.e. all three types of firms exist in equilibrium). Start from the labour market clearing 
conditions for the two countries:   
𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 = 𝑛𝑛𝐻𝐻(𝛼𝛼𝐻𝐻 + 𝛽𝛽𝐻𝐻𝑥𝑥𝐻𝐻) + 𝑛𝑛𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀[(1 + 𝛾𝛾)𝛼𝛼𝐻𝐻 + (1 − 𝛾𝛾)𝛽𝛽𝐻𝐻𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀], (17𝑎𝑎)  
𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹 = 𝑛𝑛𝐹𝐹(𝛼𝛼𝐹𝐹 + 𝛽𝛽𝐹𝐹𝑥𝑥𝐹𝐹) + 𝑛𝑛𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀(𝛾𝛾𝛽𝛽𝐻𝐻𝑥𝑥𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀).                                       (17𝑏𝑏)  
These conditions, when combined with the assumption that 𝑛𝑛𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 = 𝜓𝜓𝑛𝑛𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴, allows us to 
solve for the number of national and multinational firms in equilibrium: 
𝑛𝑛𝐻𝐻 = (1−𝜃𝜃)𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 {1 − 𝜓𝜓[(1 − 𝜃𝜃)(1 + 𝛾𝛾) + 𝜃𝜃(1 − 𝛾𝛾)𝚽𝚽]}, (18𝑎𝑎)  
𝑛𝑛𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 = 𝜓𝜓(1−𝜃𝜃)𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 ,                                                                           (18𝑏𝑏)  
𝑛𝑛𝐹𝐹 = �1−𝜃𝜃𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 � {𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹 − 𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝜓𝜓𝛾𝛾𝜃𝜃𝚽𝚽}.                                            (18𝑐𝑐)  
There are fewer domestic firms in both countries than when there are no multinational 
firms, since some labour in each country is now employed by multinational firms. In 
fact, since each multinational firm employs more workers than the domestic Home firm 
it replaced, the total number of firms is reduced in the presence of multinationals. In 
addition, equations (18a) and (18c) show the conditions for an internal solution. From 
equation (18a), Home domestic firms exist (𝑛𝑛𝐻𝐻 ≥ 0) provided the fraction of Home 
firms which are multinational, 𝜓𝜓, is not too large. Foreign domestic firms exist (𝑛𝑛𝐹𝐹 ≥0) provided Foreign is not too small relative to Home.  
 
To obtain utility in the presence of multinational firms, first note that since goods 
prices are equalised across countries and preferences are homothetic, we can define the 


















. (19𝑏𝑏)  
The key difference between equations (19a) and (19b) lies in the fact that multinational 
firms can make positive profits, which are distributed to Home consumers, thus 
implying that 𝛀𝛀𝑯𝑯
𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴 > 𝛀𝛀𝑯𝑯𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭, and 𝛀𝛀𝑭𝑭𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴 < 𝛀𝛀𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭. Utility in the presence of multinational 
firms is:  
𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖
















































⎫ . (20)  
Although this is a cumbersome expression, it is not difficult to interpret. The first line 
in the curly brackets is the welfare from consumption of Home national varieties, the 
second line is the welfare from consumption of Foreign national varieties, and the third 
line is the welfare from consumption of multinational varieties. In addition, there are 
similarities between it and utility under trade in goods alone. Hence welfare in the 


























































⎫ . (21)  
This time, the first term of the first line in square brackets is the gain from 
multinational varieties, the second term of the first line is the loss from the reduced 
number of Foreign varieties, and the second line is the loss from the reduced number 
of Home varieties. Equation (21) is difficult to sign analytically. However, if the love-
for-variety parameter 𝜃𝜃 is sufficiently large (as assumed above), then 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 > 1. That 
is, the presence of multinational firms leads to a welfare gain relative to the case 
without multinationals. The reason for this is intuitive. Because multinational firms 
are larger than the domestic Home firms they have replaced, there are fewer varieties 
of the good available for consumption. This is offset by the productivity gain from 
multinational firms. Provided 𝜃𝜃 is sufficiently large, the loss from fewer varieties is 
outweighed by the gain in productivity, leading to an overall welfare gain.  
 
We can establish that 𝑑𝑑𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻⁄ > 0, 𝑑𝑑𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹⁄ < 0, 𝑑𝑑𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 𝑑𝑑𝜓𝜓⁄ > 0, and 
𝑑𝑑𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 𝑑𝑑𝛾𝛾⁄ > 0. That is, the gain from multinational firms is larger the larger is the 
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Home country, the smaller is the Foreign country, the larger the fraction of 
multinational firms, and the larger the fraction of foreign activities. These are as we 
may expect: the larger the role of multinational firms in the global economy, the greater 
will be their effect on welfare.  
 
Figure 2: Welfare with multinational firms relative to trade in goods.  
Figure 2a: Home welfare as a function of 𝛾𝛾  
 
Figure 2b: Home welfare as a function of 𝜓𝜓  
 
 
Figure 2c: Foreign welfare as a function of 𝛾𝛾 
 
 
Figure 2d: Foreign welfare as a function of 𝜓𝜓 
 
Note: Parameter values assumed: 𝛼𝛼𝐻𝐻 = 2,   𝛼𝛼𝐹𝐹 = 8,   𝛽𝛽𝐻𝐻 = 1.5,   𝛽𝛽𝐹𝐹 = 3,   𝜃𝜃 = 0.8,   𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 + 𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹 = 24. In 































































Figure 2 presents the gain from multinational firms relative to trade in goods for the 
two countries as a function of 𝛾𝛾 and 𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 (Figures 2a and 2c), and as a function of 𝜓𝜓 
and 𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 (Figures 2b and 2d), holding world endowment of labour 𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 + 𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹 constant. 
Clearly, the gains are increasing in all three parameters for both countries. A few 
comparisons may be made. First, an increase in the share of multinational firms 𝜓𝜓 has 
a smaller impact than an increase in the fraction of assembly activities performed 
abroad 𝛾𝛾 on the gains from multinational firms for both countries. The channel through 
which the two parameters operate is very different. An increase in 𝛾𝛾 increases the size 
of the multinational firm, while keeping the number of multinational firms unchanged. 
On the other hand, an increase in 𝜓𝜓 increases the ratio of multinational firms to 
domestic Home firms, while keeping the size of the multinational firm unchanged.  
 
A second comparison that can be made is between the gains to Home and Foreign. 
Noting that the vertical axis has a smaller scale in Figures 2c and 2d compared to 
Figures 2a and 2b, Home gains much more than Foreign does from multinational firms. 
This is because multinationals make supernormal profits, which are distributed to 
Home consumers, thus raising their income. Foreign consumers therefore have a smaller 
share of world income, which reduces their (still positive) gain from the multinational 
firms.  
 
Finally, a comparison can be made between Figure 2 and Figure 1. It is clear that the 
gains from allowing for multinational firms relative to free trade are smaller than the 
gains from free trade relative to autarky. This is perhaps not surprising. Moving from 
autarky to free trade (with or without multinational firms) enlarges the market, leading 
to gains from increased variety, whereas introducing multinational firms actually 
reduces the total number of varieties available. In addition, recall that the welfare 
effects of multinational firms arise without factor price adjustments (c.f. Helpman and 
Krugman (1985) Chapter 12); they exist because of the shift towards a more efficient 
means of production. 
 
The pattern of trade may be described as follows. Home and Foreign domestic firms 
export a fraction of their output in the usual Krugman (1980) manner, depending on 
the relative incomes of the two countries. Multinational firms export headquarters 
services and part of the product from Home to Foreign, and import the other part of 
the product. Viewed in this manner, if overall trade is balanced, then the model 
predicts that the developed Home country will run a deficit in trade in goods, which 
is balanced by its trade surplus in headquarters services. Hence, the model provides 
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one potential explanation for the large deficit in goods trade of countries like the US 
and UK (and, conversely, the large trade surpluses of countries like China).   
 
3 Empirical evidence 
 
The data which we use comes from the UNCTAD World Investment Report, which 
presents data for the 100 largest non-financial multinational firms in the world (ranked 
by foreign assets), and the 100 largest non-financial multinational firms from 
developing countries (50 largest from developing countries before 2004). Although the 
World Investment Report has been published since 1991, early data was often 
incomplete. The sample we use thus starts from 2000 and ends in 2015 for developing 
country firms and 2016 for world firms. One year of data is missing: 2014 for world 
firms, and 2013 for developing country firms. A few firms – the largest developing 
country firms – appear in both samples; in these cases the duplicates are dropped, and 
never exceeds ten firms in any given year7. Variable definitions are provided in the 
Methodological Notes to the World Investment Report (UNCTAD (2017)).  
 
Table 1: The 10 largest multinational firms from all countries and developing countries, 
2015.  
All firms   Developing countries  
Firm Foreign 
Assets 
 Firm Foreign 
Assets 
Royal Dutch Shell 288,283  CK Hutchison 118,250 
Toyota 273,280  China Nat. Offshore Oil Corp 66,673 
General Electric 257,751  Hon Hai (Foxconn) 64,040 
Total 236,719  Samsung Electronics 62,294 
BP 216,698  Petronas 47,912 
Exxon Mobil 193,493  China Shipping Corp 43,076 
Chevron 191,933  Vale  35,338 
Volkswagen 181,826  China Minmetals Corp 35,165 
Vodafone 166,967  America Movil 34,480 
Apple Computer 143,652  Tata Motors 30,589 
Note: Foreign assets are in US$millions.  
 
It may seem incongruous to use data on multinational firms from both developed and 
developing countries, given our theoretical model which predicts multinational firms 
emerging only in developed countries. However, almost all the firms in the sample from 
                                                          
7 There is entry and exit of firms from the sample in each year. Firms which exit the sample tend to be 
the smaller firms in the previous year. However, we do not have data on firms which exit the sample, 
so we are not able to estimate a Heckman selection model. Therefore our results may be interpreted as 
being conditional on remaining in the sample. Tables 2 and 3 report the number of firms in the sample, 
so the magnitude of this effect can be assessed.  
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developing countries are from countries which are not the poorest countries in the 
world. For instance, in 2015, of the 100 firms from developing countries, 18 were from 
China, 14 from Hong Kong, 10 from Singapore, 8 from India, 7 apiece from South 
Korea and Mexico, 6 apiece from Brazil, South Africa, and Taiwan, and 5 from 
Malaysia, with the remaining 13 from a variety of countries. By the same token, it is 
instructive to identify the largest firms in our sample, for both groups of countries; 
this is shown in Table 1 for 2015. Perhaps unsurprisingly, since the sample is based on 
foreign assets, the list is dominated by petrochemical and mining firms, with many of 
the other firms being involved in electronics or motor vehicles.  
 
Results 1 and 2 in Section 2 above provide two testable hypotheses. Result 1 states 
that there is a positive association between domestic and foreign employment by a 
multinational firm. Result 2 states that a firm which expands its foreign employment, 
will experience more revenues. We therefore estimate the following equations 
separately, where each observation is a firm 𝑖𝑖 in year 𝑡𝑡:  ln𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿1 ln𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, (22) ln𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝜅𝜅𝑖𝑖 + 𝜅𝜅𝑖𝑖 + 𝜅𝜅1 ln𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, (23) 
where 𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the firm’s domestic employment, 𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is total revenue of the firm, 𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
is the firm’s foreign employment, 𝜅𝜅𝑖𝑖 , 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖, 𝜅𝜅𝑖𝑖 and 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 are firm and year fixed effects, and 
𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 and 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 are the error terms. The inclusion of the firm and year fixed effects means 
that we can control for unobserved heterogeneity across firms and across time, and 
that the coefficients are identified through within-firm, across-time variation in the 
data.  
 
Foreign employment is likely to be simultaneously determined with domestic 
employment, and with total revenue. Hence, in addition to the standard fixed effects 
estimator, we also perform some Instrumental Variables-Generalized Method of 
Moments (IV-GMM) estimation8. Limitations in the data mean that we are 
constrained in the choice of instruments we can use. We therefore instrument foreign 
employment with lagged foreign revenues and foreign assets. These instruments are 
likely to be highly correlated with the instrumented variable. For the instruments to 
be valid, the identifying assumption is that past values of foreign revenues and assets 
would affect current domestic employment and total revenue only through their effect 
on current foreign employment. We perform the standard IV specification tests to test 
the validity of the instruments. Figure 3 shows the distribution of total revenues over 
                                                          
8 IV-GMM is efficient in the presence of heteroscedasticity of unknown form, whereas the conventional 
IV estimator is not.  
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time. There is convergence of firm sizes, which may be explained by firms from 
developing countries, which are on average smaller, growing more rapidly on average 
than firms from developed countries9.  
 
Figure 3: Distribution of total revenues, 2005, 2010 and 2015.  
 
 
3.1 Foreign and domestic employment  
 
We use our data to ask the following question: Do multinational firms export jobs? 
That is, does increasing foreign employment imply a reduction in domestic 
employment? Figure 4 presents a first answer to this question: unambiguously, no. In 
fact, quite the opposite: there is a positive correlation between firms’ employment 
abroad, with their employment at home (the correlation coefficient is 0.44, with a p-
value of 0.000, while the best-fit line implies that a 1 percent increase in foreign 
employment is associated with a 0.58 percent increase in domestic employment). 
 
Although Figure 4 is suggestive, it does not control for firm-specific or time-specific 
characteristics, so the correlation observed may be due to some firm characteristics. 
We therefore turn to more formal econometric analysis. Table 2 presents the results of 
                                                          
9 Across the full sample, the average annual growth rate of total revenues for firms from developed 
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estimating equation (22). Columns (1) and (2) report the fixed effects results, without 
and with year fixed effects, columns (3) and (4) report the IV-GMM results, and 
columns (5) and (6) report the first stage of the IV-GMM regressions. Since the IV-
GMM estimates entail the use of lags as instruments, we lose many observations; for 
consistency, we report results for the same sample across specifications. The 
conventional fixed effects estimates do not yield a statistically significant relationship 
between domestic and foreign employment. However, the IV-GMM results are positive 
and highly significant, confirming the result in Figure 4 and Result 1 from the model, 
that foreign employment has a positive effect on domestic employment. Since the main 
variables are in logs, there is a simple interpretation of the size of the coefficients: for 
the IV-GMM results, a 1 percent increase in foreign employment will increase domestic 
employment by 0.4 to 0.5 percent. The IV-GMM coefficients are much larger than the 
fixed effects coefficients, which may indicate that the IV-GMM approach is able to 
overcome the attenuation bias associated with the endogeneity of foreign employment. 
 



























Table 2: Foreign and domestic employment.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variable ln𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ln𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ln𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ln𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ln𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ln𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
Estimation Method FE FE IV-GMM IV-GMM FE FE ln𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 -0.038 -0.085 0.363 0.512   
 (0.123) (0.133) (0.104)** (0.153)**   ln𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1     0.215 0.225 
     (0.041)** (0.047)** ln𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1     0.279 0.317 
     (0.057)** (0.057)** 
𝑅𝑅2  0.00 0.03   0.25 0.26 
𝑁𝑁 × 𝑇𝑇 1,842 1,842 1,842 1,842 1,842 1,842 
𝑁𝑁 271 271 271 271 271 271 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Hansen test    0.73 0.33   
Hansen p-value    0.39 0.57   
Kleibergen-Paap UnderID test    40.13 36.84   
K-P test p-value    0.00 0.00   
Kleibergen-Paap Weak ID test   77.33 52.64   
Notes: * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses. Columns (5) and (6) report the first stage results of the IV-
GMM estimates in columns (3) and (4). Estimation method is by fixed effects in columns (1), (2), (5) and (6), and by IV-GMM in columns (3) and (4), in which ln𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is treated as endogenous and is instrumented with lagged foreign revenues ln𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 and lagged foreign assets ln𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1. Since there is a single endogenous 
regressor, the Kleibergen-Paap Weak ID test is identical to the first-stage F-statistics. The Kleibergen-Paap Weak ID test statistics lies outside the 10% maximal 
IV size of the Stock-Yogo critical values in columns (3) and (4). 
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Table 2 also reports several diagnostic tests of the IV-GMM estimator. The Hansen 
test of overidentification is never rejected at any conventional significance levels, 
indicating joint validity of the instruments used. On the other hand, the Kleibergen-
Paap underidentification test and the Kleibergen-Paap weak identification test 
strongly reject the null of under- and weak identification, respectively. The results in 
columns (5) and (6) of Table 2 also indicate that the two instruments used, lagged 
foreign revenues and lagged foreign assets, are both highly significantly (and positively) 
associated with foreign employment. Overall the diagnostic tests support the choice of 
instruments used.  
 
3.2 Firm size and multinational activity 
 
Figure 5 presents a scatter diagram of total revenues and foreign employment, for 2015. 
There is an unambiguous positive association between the two variables: on average, 
firms with more foreign employment have more total revenues. The correlation 
coefficient is 0.49, with a p-value of 0.000, and the best-fit line implies that a 1 percent 
increase in foreign employment is associated with a 0.46 percent increase in total 
revenues.  
 























Table 3: Foreign employment and total revenues (dependent variable: ln𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖).  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variable ln𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ln𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ln𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ln𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ln𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ln𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
Estimation Method FE FE IV-GMM IV-GMM FE FE ln𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 0.366 0.218 1.192 0.892   
 (0.050)** (0.040)** (0.105)** (0.106)**   ln𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1     0.212 0.222 
     (0.041)** (0.047)** ln𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1     0.278 0.319 
     (0.056)** (0.057)** 
𝑅𝑅2  0.23 0.53   0.24 0.25 
𝑁𝑁 × 𝑇𝑇 1,851 1,851 1,851 1,851 1,851 1,851 
𝑁𝑁 272 272 272 272 272 272 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Hansen test    0.76 1.50   
Hansen p-value    0.38 0.22   
Kleibergen-Paap UnderID test    39.69 36.61   
K-P test p-value    0.00 0.00   
Kleibergen-Paap Weak ID test   76.69 53.44   
Notes: * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses. Columns (5) and (6) report the first stage results of the IV-
GMM estimates in columns (3) and (4). Estimation method is by fixed effects in columns (1), (2), (5) and (6), and by IV-GMM in columns (3) and (4), in which ln𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is treated as endogenous and is instrumented with lagged foreign revenues ln𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 and lagged foreign assets ln𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1. Since there is a single endogenous 
regressor, the Kleibergen-Paap Weak ID test is identical to the first-stage F-statistics. The Kleibergen-Paap Weak ID test statistics lies outside the 10% maximal 




Turning to more formal econometric evidence, the results of estimating equation (19) 
are reported in Table 3. As with Table 2, columns (1) and (2) report fixed effects 
results without and with year fixed effects, columns (3) and (4) perform the same for 
IV-GMM results, and columns (5) and (6) report the first stage of the IV-GMM 
regressions. In columns (1) to (4), we find a positive and highly significant relationship 
between foreign employment and total revenues. This is supportive of Figure 5 and 
Result 2 from the theoretical model. The size of the IV-GMM coefficients indicate that 
a 1 percent increase in foreign employment will increase the total revenue of a firm by 
0.9 to 1.1 percent. As before, the larger IV-GMM coefficients as compared with the 
fixed effects results may be indicative of the attenuation bias caused by the 
simultaneity between foreign and domestic employment. Similarly, the diagnostic tests 
and first stage regressions (columns (5) and (6)) are very similar to those reported in 
Table 2, since we employ the same instruments to instrument the same variable 
(although the sample size is slightly different from that in Table 2). All these 
diagnostics suggest that we can be confident in the instruments chosen. We conclude 
that the empirical evidence is supportive of the presence of a positive association 
between foreign employment and the total revenue of the firm.  
 
3.3 Sensitivity and alternative specifications 
 
For brevity we have only presented the main econometric results. There are many 
extensions that could be pursued in terms of data and methods, and results are 
available from the author upon request. On the data side, there are several ways in 
which the data could be sliced; for instance, whether the firm is from a developing 
country or not, and before and after the Great Recession of 2008. Results are broadly 
consistent across samples. 
 
Many alternative econometric specifications could be explored. For example, using 
lagged foreign employment in columns (1) and (2) of Table 2 instead of current foreign 
employment, results in coefficients which are positive and often statistically significant. 
Estimating foreign employment as a function of domestic employment (i.e. the opposite 
of what is reported in Table 2) yields very similar results. Alternative estimation 
methods could also be used, for example Limited Information Maximum Likelihood 
(LIML) and Continuously Updated GMM Estimator (CUE), which have superior small 
sample properties when compared with the IV-GMM methods used in the main results. 
More ambitious would be to try and simultaneously estimate foreign and domestic 
employment in Table 2 (likewise total revenue and foreign employment in Table 3) 






In this paper we develop a simple model of vertical multinational firms in which firms 
engage in production abroad in order to benefit from lower wages. The model is an 
extension of the Krugman (1980) model of international trade under monopolistic 
competition, and yields two empirical predictions. First, a firm that expands its foreign 
activities also expands its domestic activities. Second the more activities that are 
produced abroad by a firm, the larger the firm becomes. Both predictions are confirmed 
using data on the largest multinational firms in the world. The model also generates 
the result that multinational firms yield a small but positive effect on global welfare.  
 
The analysis in this paper can be extended on both the theoretical and empirical sides. 
On the theoretical side, the obvious extensions are to consider differences in factor 
intensities and factor endowments (Markusen and Venables (2000)), firm heterogeneity 
(Helpman et al (2004)), or richer patterns of comparative advantage (Soo (2017)). 
These extensions may also aid in endogenising some of the parameters which we 
currently take as exogenous. Similarly, on the empirical side, more detailed and richer 
data, for instance on the countries or activities which multinational firms engage in 
abroad, may yield a more nuanced picture of the activities and implications of 
multinational firms, and may help guide the development of models which are more 
useful for understanding multinational firms. 
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Appendix A: Multinationals and offshoring: More than just semantics?  
 
What is the difference between a multinational firm, and a firm which engages in 
offshoring? In some sense, the difference is merely semantic: offshoring is a more recent 
term than multinational firm. For instance, According to Google Books, the term 
“offshoring” experienced a quadrupling in use between 1996 and 1997, with a 
subsequent rapid increase, whereas there was no concurrent increase in the use of the 
term “multinational”. As another example, in the Handbook of International Economics 
Volume 3 (published in 1995), there is no entry in the Index of either “offshoring” or 
“outsourcing”, and two multi-page entries on “multinational enterprises” (both referring 
to Krugman’s chapter). In Volume 4 (published in 2014), there are entries for both 
“offshoring” and “multinational firms”.  
 
On the other hand, it may be argued that the distinction between the two terms lies 
in the boundaries of the multinational firm (see Antras and Rossi-Hansberg (2009)). 
A multinational firm owns its foreign production facilities, whereas a firm which 
offshores part of its production, is engaged in arms-length transactions with its 
suppliers. In the paper, we abstract from issues surrounding the boundaries of the firm. 
Hence we make use of the term “multinational firm”, and assume that all parts of the 
production process occur within the firm.   
 
Appendix B: Allowing for a fixed cost in Foreign 
 
Suppose that, in addition to the higher fixed cost at Home, becoming a multinational 
firm also incurs a fixed cost in Foreign, equal to 𝛾𝛾𝛼𝛼𝐻𝐻. In this formulation, the fixed 
cost rises with the share of production carried out in Foreign. Then, the profit of the 
firm will be:  
𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 = 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 − (1 + 𝛾𝛾)𝑤𝑤𝐻𝐻𝛼𝛼𝐻𝐻 − (1 − 𝛾𝛾)𝑤𝑤𝐻𝐻𝛽𝛽𝐻𝐻𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀    
−𝛾𝛾𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹𝛼𝛼𝐻𝐻 − 𝛾𝛾𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹𝛽𝛽𝐻𝐻𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 . (𝐵𝐵1) 
Since prices depend only on marginal costs and not on fixed costs, and since the 
multinational firm’s output is a multiple of a domestic Home firm’s output that does 
not depend on fixed costs, prices and output remain as in equations (10) and (12). 
Similarly, Results 1 and 2 are unaffected. What does change, is equation (13) setting 
the condition for which the assumed equilibrium is indeed an equilibrium. Now, we 
require:  
𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 ≥
[(1+𝛾𝛾)𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖+𝛾𝛾𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖][(1−𝛾𝛾)𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖+𝛾𝛾𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖] � 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝜃𝜃𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖(1−𝜃𝜃)� (𝐵𝐵2)  
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This is a more stringent requirement than equation (13); the addition of the fixed cost 
in Foreign makes it harder for a multinational firm to make non-negative profits and 
satisfy the participation constraint. The labour market clearing conditions are (17a) 
and:  
𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹 = 𝑛𝑛𝐹𝐹(𝛼𝛼𝐹𝐹 + 𝛽𝛽𝐹𝐹𝑥𝑥𝐹𝐹) + 𝑛𝑛𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀(𝛾𝛾𝛼𝛼𝐻𝐻 + 𝛾𝛾𝛽𝛽𝐻𝐻𝑥𝑥𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀).                  (𝐵𝐵3) 
Hence the number of domestic Home firms is given by (18a), while the number of 
domestic Foreign firms is:  
𝑛𝑛𝐹𝐹 = �1−𝜃𝜃𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 � {𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹 − 𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝜓𝜓𝛾𝛾(1 − 𝜃𝜃 + 𝜃𝜃𝚽𝚽)}, (𝐵𝐵4)  
which is fewer than the case in the text, for the obvious reason: because multinational 
firms now use more labour in Foreign, there is less labour left for domestic Foreign 
firms. The expressions for the income shares of the two countries are given by (19a) 
and (19b), except that, because of the additional fixed cost, multinational firms’ profits 
are lower, so 𝛀𝛀𝑯𝑯
𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴 is smaller, and 𝛀𝛀𝑭𝑭
𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴 is larger. Utility with multinational firms is 

















































⎫ (𝐵𝐵5)  
Where the only difference from equation (20) is in the second line showing the welfare 
from consumption of Foreign national varieties. Hence the gain from having 


























































⎫ . (𝐵𝐵6)  
Where again the only difference is that the smaller number of Foreign varieties reduces 
the gains from multinational firms. We therefore conclude that adding a fixed cost in 
Foreign has no material impact on the results in the text.  
 
This setup could be further extended. For example, one could specify the fixed cost as 
consisting of a headquarters fixed cost and a plant fixed cost, so that  
𝛼𝛼𝐻𝐻 = 𝛼𝛼𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 + 𝛼𝛼𝐻𝐻𝑃𝑃 . (𝐵𝐵7) 
Becoming a multinational firm may increase the headquarters cost for reasons 
explained in the text, but may reduce the plant fixed cost since part of the production 
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process is now done abroad. Then the total fixed cost of the multinational firm in 
terms of labour would be:  (1 + 𝛿𝛿)𝛼𝛼𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 + (1 − 𝛾𝛾)𝛼𝛼𝐻𝐻𝑃𝑃 + 𝛾𝛾𝛼𝛼𝐻𝐻𝑃𝑃 (𝐵𝐵8) 
Where the first term is the headquarters cost including the additional cost of becoming 
a multinational and 𝛿𝛿 ≠ 𝛾𝛾, the second term is the reduced plant cost in Home due to 
the reduced production being done at Home, and the third term is the fixed cost of 
opening a plant in Foreign. Provided the conditions specified in the text are met, these 
extensions have no material impact on the results in the text.  
 
